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REQUIREMENTS AND EVALUATION TECHNIQUES 
FOR ONLINE-VOTING 
Melanie Volkamer1, Robert Krimmer2 
Abstract – Online-Voting is more and more in use, and even in political elections 
as the current Estonian elections (March 2007) show. Currently these systems are 
not either not evaluated or the evaluation reports are not comparable, even if 
each of them is consistent and contains trustful and convincing arguments. The 
problem is the leak of unified rational requirements and evaluation techniques. 
Therefore, after having presented both in [11] for voting devices, we present in 
this paper a list of requirements Online-Voting shall ensure and describe how to 
evaluate the different categories of requirements 
1. Introduction 
Several Online Elections trials took place in the past ten years all around the globe in various 
forms and on different political levels. Some of the online elections where even legally 
binding. The decision to choose a specific approach or even a concrete system was based on a 
couple of different facts. In general, the choice was not only made by the responsible election 
authority (REA). Rather the REA was supported by either a group of security experts, a 
security company, or a security civil service that analysed the system. These groups used 
different approaches for their analysis and focused on different aspects: eg, concentrating on 
the cryptographic protocol or a more general testing of the software. Thereby each group 
defined their ”own” re-quirements (mainly deduced from the five election principles) the 
system should be evaluated against. Thus, the level of details of the requirements definition 
differs a lot. Moreover, the available list of requirements for Online Elections has in common 
that a concise definition of the intruder and trust model is missing. Consequently, the 
evaluations are not transparent to the public and it is not possible to compare different 
systems based on the evaluation reports Thus, this paper is a first step to come closer to a 
standardised Online Election System evaluation. As a starting point we need to define a 
complete, consistent and stable set of requirements (see section 5). For this paper we 
concentrate on functional and security requirements (so called security objectives) and narrow 
the objective of assessment down (see section 2). The formalism to describe this set is 
according to the Common Criteria Methodology [1] and is based on already existing sets of 
requirements (see section 3). The next step the requirements are classified in different 
categories according to the proposed evaluation technique. 
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2. Object of Assessment 
An Online Election system contains software and procedures before, during and after the 
elections. In the pre election phase, the generation of the election register and the ballot take 
place, depending on the authentication system the authentication tokens need to be generated 
and send to the voter. Moreover, the system needs to be configured (eg, the number of 
allowed candidates to be chosen). In the election phase, the voter casts his vote and the e-
votes are collected and stored. In the post election phase, the election outcome is computed 
and depending on the system, voter or universal verification procedures can take place. 
Because of space reasons, we assume that the voter and only voters have the proper 
authentication tokens and all the configurations are made accurately (eg, no voters are missing 
in the election register, the candidates are listed in the right order and the e-ballot box is 
empty). Never the less we are aware of the problem, that intrusions to the pre election phase 
can violate already the election secrecy as well as change the outcome at the end. The other 
way round it is difficult to cover those e-voting systems where the voter already get an 
anonymous authentication token. Moreover, we are not discussing as detailed in [10]. In 
addition, we skipped the topic disputations, eg, voters not having received authentication 
tokens, coming to a negative verification result, who cannot log on the system, or cast a vote. 
3. Requirements Definition 
The requirements below are derived from the German list of requirements [12] (which are 
defined as a Protection Profile based on the Common Criteria) as an expansion of the 
requirements proposed in [11] for voting devices. While the main idea, methodology and the 
terminology is taken from [11], the new classifications of evaluation methodologies are 
related to [12]. We use the same terminology as described in the glossary of [11] and the key 
words SHALL and SHOULD are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.Words and phrases 
from the glossary appear ·like this·. The most important items are displayed in figure 1. We 
distinguish ·voting software on the voting server site· and ·voting server·. While the 
requirements containing ·voting software on the voting server site· demand the software itself 
to ensure it, the requirement containing ·voting server· can be either ensured by the ·voting 
software on the voting server site· or the environment of the software. Moreover, we are 
talking only about one voting server to keep the requirements more generic. In an 
instantiation to a specific system it can be replace to the particular component. Analogous to 
[11], each requirement is associated with at least one of the election principles. We add the 
category [dp] to classify requirements related to data protection. As already mentioned in 
[11], certain terms can only be defined by the ·responsible election authority·. They appear 
underlined. 
In [11], the requirements are divided into the following categories: system requirements, 
operational requirements and assurance requirements. System requirements are further 
distinguishes between functional, security, auditing and usability requirements. 
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Fig. 1: Components of the e-voting system 
The usability, auditing, operational and assurance requirements are very similar for ·voting 
devices· and ·online voting·. Because of space reasons we do not repeat those requirements 
with the small changes but concentrate on the functional and security requirements which we 
call Security Objectives (O). These are re-categorised according to the Common Criteria [1] 
speech: Security Objectives mitigating against specific Threats (T) (see section 5.1) and 
Security Objectives based on Organisational Security Policies (P) (see section 5.2). We assign 
possible threats to a security objective while we left out the definition of organisational 
security policies because they are similar to the corresponding security objective.  
4. Methods of Assessments  
The categorisation into the two kind of security objectives is relevant for the applied 
evaluation techniques. While those deduced from organisational security policies can easily 
be checked (does the corresponding functionality exists?) there is more effort necessary to 
decide about the others. Here the definition of the expected intruder model is essential, 
including the intruder’s capabilities, his knowledge and his goals: With respect to his goals 
we distinguish between breaking the election secrecy, faking the election outcome, computing 
intermediate results and changing the ballot. With respect to his capabilities and knowledge 
be distinguish between  
 outside intruders: those who use any public available information and can read on the 
network. Note: There is a difference between these information available during the 
polling period and those after. The second category of information can be used to 
compute intermediate results but this is uninteresting after the election) and  
 inside intruders: those who can change software and data and who can decrypt data 
(knowing corresponding keys). In addition they know all the outsider information. 
These are either administrators, the developers of the software or the one hosting the 
voting server. 
 a single malicious voter or a single malicious administrator. 
After having defined all these threats the evaluation task starts. There are two possibilities for 
an e-voting system to overcome a threat: Either the e-voting system provides the functionality 
or the e-voting system needs to be supported by the environment to do so. For instance the e-
voting system might only ensure the one-voter-one-vote principle under the additional 
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organisation assumption that the voter does not forward his authentication token to someone 
else to give this person the possibility to vote in his behalf. Another example is that the e-
voting system might only be receipt-free under the assumption that the voter’s client is 
trustworthy. This fits very well for threats provoked by an outside intruder or a malicious 
voter. The evaluator would here come up with a list of assumptions which needs to hold in 
order to fend the threats. The responsible election authority has then to ensure that the 
assumptions are given in the environment where the e-voting system is used. Otherwise the e-
voting system should not be used. With respect to the evaluation whether threats by inside 
intruders are fended we need to be careful because we are talking only about one voting 
server in the security objectives. If there would be only one entity running the whole election 
then such a single entity has to be trusted with respect to all security objectives. Thus, a 
common approach is to split the voting server into several sub entities such that 
compromising security objectives requires compromising two or more entities. To evaluate 
corresponding security objectives, it is essential to analyse the number of entities needed to be 
compromised in order to successfully attack the e-voting system according the described 
threat. To do so we introduced the term (k1+...+km out of n1+...+nm)
i
-resilient: A system is 
called k-resilient w.r.t. a security objective, k ≥ 1, if at least k entities need to be corrupted to 
compromise the security objective. So, if a system relies on a single trusted entity with respect 
to a particular security objective it is just 1-resilient w.r.t. this security objective.  
If more entities are involved it is generally easier to find a collusion of corrupted entities. For 
example, a 1-resilient system in which any of 10 involved entities can be corrupted is worse 
than a 1-resilient system in which any of 5 involved entities can be corrupted. Therefore, we 
propose to determine for all possible threats the total number of entities n and call it k out of 
n-resilient w.r.t. a security objective.  
Moreover, we have to take into account that, eg, in case of 2 -resilient, it might happen that 
for one entity you can choose one out of x and for the second one you can choose one out of 
y. To display this in our result, we use (k1+...+km out of n1 +...+nm). For some security 
objectives there might be different possibilities to violate it either by entity A and B or by 




We have not yet clearly defined what we call a sub entity of the voting server. Such an entity 
contains software, hardware and operating system in use on the server as well as the persons 
in charge (including the developers of the software, persons setting any configuration at the 
server as well as the administrators and poll-workers operating at this server). 
Throughout it is assumed that the cryptographic primitives used are secure; for instance, it is 
assumed that the security provided by the symmetric ciphers used by the system cannot be 
broken other than by getting direct access to the secret keys. 
5. Security Objectives 
The security objectives are divided in those deduced from organisational security policies and 
those to fend threats. 
Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. Seite 5 
5.1 Security Objectives related to Threats 
O_1 [all] The ·voting server· SHOULD be tamper-resistant. The ·voting server· SHALL be 
tamper-evident. 
T_1 An inside intruder tampers the ·voting server· in order to 
a. fake results (either by altering, adding or deleting ·votes·), 
b. compute intermediate results, 
c. break the election secrecy, 
d. prove the link between a particular ·voter· and his ·vote·, 
e. get knowledge about personal data from the ·voters·. 
T_2 An outside intruder gets access to the ·voting server· over the network in order to tamper 
it. 
O_2 [all] The only application running on the ·voter’s client· SHOULD be the ·voting client·. 
Where other application run in parallel they SHALL not interfere with the ·voting client·. 
T_3 Any intruder runs on the ·voter’s client· malware which either read the ·vote· (break 
election secrecy), alter the ·vote·, or read the authentication information to cast a ·vote·(change 
the outcome). 
O_3 [se] The ·e-voting system· SHALL only provide receipt-free information to the ·voter·. 
T_4 An outside intruder can prove the link between a particular ·voter· and his ·vote·. 
O_4 [se] The ·e-voting system· SHOULD ensure that the ·voter· is not able to construct a receipt 
proving his ·vote·. 
T_5 A malicious ·voter· uses all information sent to his ·voter’s client·, displayed on his 
·voter’s client· and sent from his ·voter’s client· to construct a proof in order to sell his ·vote·. 
T_6 A malicious ·voter· uses all information from above and uses intermediate results 
calculated on his ·voter’s client· to construct a proof in order to sell his ·vote·. 
T_7 A malicious ·voter· cooperates with an intruder of the ·voting server· in order to prove his 
decision. 
O_5 [dp] The ·e-voting system· SHALL ensure the data protection law with respect to the 
transmission of the ·identification data·. 
T_8 An outside intruder reading on the network gets knowledge about personal data from the 
·voter·. 
O_6 [fr] The ·e-voting system· SHALL not provide any information in transmitted protocol 
messages, which allow to construct the link between the a particular ·voter· and his ·vote·. 
Appl. Note: The ·e-voting system· SHALL ensure that neither the ·vote· itself nor the number 
of chosen candidates (including an empty ballot), nor a spoilt ·vote· (eg, by using the 
length of the protocol messages) can be linked to a particular ·voter·. 
T_9 The outside intruder reading on the network breaks the election secrecy. 
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O_7 [fr] The ·e-voting system· SHALL ensure the confidentiality of the transmitted ·e-votes· 
during the ·polling period·. 
Appl. Note: The ·e-voting system· SHALL ensure that neither the ·vote· itself nor the number 
of chosen candidates (including an empty ballot), nor a spoilt ·vote· (eg, by using the 
length of the protocol messages depending on the approach) can be deduced by reading all 
transmitted voting protocol messages. 
T_10 The outside intruder reading on the network computes intermediate results. 
O_8 [all] The ·voting client· SHOULD only communicate with the proper ·voting server·. The 
·voting client· SHALL clearly indicate to the ·voter· whether it is connected with the proper 
·voting server·. 
T_11 An outside intruder tries to redirect the ·voter· to a faked ·voting server· in order to  
 take his authentication data to vote on behalf of the voter,  
 alter his ·vote· before forwarding it to the proper ·voting server, 
 delete his ·vote· and thus change the outcome, 
 get knowledge about the ·voter’s· ·vote· and thus break the election secrecy. 
O_9 [all] The ·e-voting system· SHALL verify the authenticity, freshness and integrity of all 
transmitted protocol messages before processing them. 
T_12 An outside intruder  
 replays old protocol messages or  
 sends new ones to the ·voting server· 
in order to add votes and thereby change the election outcome. 
T_13 An inside intruder replays old protocol messages or sends new ones to the ·voting 
server· in order to add votes and thereby change the election outcome. 
O_10 [di] The ·e-voting system· SHOULD store all but only authorized·evotes· (eg, cast only 
one ·vote· per ·voter·, in the proper format, and from a proper platform) in the ·e-ballot box·. 
The ·e-voting system· SHALL be capable to distinguish between ·authorized· and 
·unauthorized· ·e-votes·. 
T_14 An outside intruder replays protocol messages in order to cast several ·votes· and thus to 
change the outcome. 
T_15 A malicious ·voter· intruder logs on the ·voting server· again in order to cast a second 
·vote· and thus to change the outcome. 
T_16 An inside intruder alters the transmitted ·e-vote· on order to change the outcome. 
O_11 [all] The ·voting server· SHALL implement an access control policy which  
 restricts all activities to particular ·user·-roles 
 requires physical presence. 
T_17 An outside intruder gets access to the ·voting server· without knowing or having the 
access tokens in order to tamper the ·voting server·. 
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O_12 [all] The access control mechanism SHOULD only allow access to the ·voting server· if at 
least two different ·users· are logged in. 
T_18 A malicious administrator abuses his access privileges to tamper data, hardware or 
software. 
O_13 [di] The ·voting server· SHALL protect the integrity and authenticity of ·e-votes· after the 
·polling period·. 
T_19 Any intruder tampers with ·e-votes· after the ·polling period· and before the ·counting 
phase· to change the outcome. 
O_14 [di] The ·counting phase· SHALL verify the integrity and authenticity of ·e-votes· 
separate, 
T_20 The intruder changes the set of ·e-votes· on the way to the ·counting procedure 
component· in order to change the outcome. 
O_15 [di] The ·e-voting system· SHOULD protect the integrity of ·election·data (at least 
including: ·votes·, results and audit information) as soon as results are calculated. 
T_21 The intruder changes the result after the results are calculated in order to change the 
outcome. 
5.2 Security Objectives related to Organisational Security Policies 
O/P_1 [all] The ·voting software on the voting server site· SHALL not provide any 
functionality to calculate results during the ·polling period·. 
O/P_2 [di] The ·voting server· SHALL provide the functionality to completely delete all data 
from previous ·elections·  
O/P_3 [tr] The ·voting software on the voting server site· SHALL provide the functionality to 
read ·e-votes· from the ·voting server· into any ·counting procedure components· in the 
‘election report’ state. 
O/P_4 [fr] The ·voting client· SHOULD provide the functionality for the ·voter· to  
 change his ·selections· before ·casting·. 
 ·spoil· his ·vote·. 
 easily cancel his ·voting process· at any time. 
 clear all his ·selections· 
O/P_5 [fr] The ·voting client· SHOULD warn the ·voter· when he tries to ·spoil· his ·vote· in one 
or more ·polls·. 
O/P_6 [un] The ·voting client· SHALL immediately transmit the ·e-vote· to the ·voting server·, 
when the ·voter· has ·cast· his ·vote·. 
O/P_7 [tr] The ·voting software on the voting server site· SHALL provide feedback to the 
·voter· regarding the status of his ·vote· (at least that his ·e-vote· has been stored successfully 
in the ·e-ballot box·). 
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O/P_8 [di] The ·e-voting system· SHALL provide mechanisms to prevent data loss during 
normal operation, and in the case of exceptions, malfunctions and ·e-voting system 
breakdown·. 
O/P_9 [un] The ·e-voting system· SHALL provide feedback in the form of error messages in the 
case of exceptions and malfunctions to the responsible ·administrators· and ·poll-workers·. 
Where a ·voter· is in the ·voting process· at that time he SHALL also get feedback. 
O/P_10 [un] The ·e-voting system· SHOULD prevent ·voter· interaction in the case of 
exceptions and malfunctions. 
O/P_11 [un] The ·e-voting system· SHALL be capable to determine whether a particular ·voter· 
cast a vote and his ·e-vote· was successfully stored in the ·e-ballot box· in the case of 
exceptions and malfunctions as well as after ·e-voting system breakdowns·. 
O/P_12 [un] The ·e-voting system· SHALL be robust against power outage at the ·voting 
server·, unexpected ·user· activity, environmental effects (mechanical, electromagnetic, 
climatic, etc.) to the ·voting server·, network problems, ·voter’s client· breakdowns and ·voting 
client· breakdowns. 
O/P_13 [tr] The ·voting server· SHOULD not provide any information about the ·voting 
process· except current state and the number of ·votes· cast so far. 
O/P_14 [se] The ·voting server· SHALL delete any record of his ·voting process· (other than the 
·e-vote· in the ·e-ballot box·) from any memory of the ·voting server·, when a ·voter· 
completes the ·voting process· (by ·casting· his ·vote· or cancelling). 
O/P_15 [tr] The ·voting server· SHALL be capable of producing comprehensive audit data. 
O/P_16 [all] The ·voting server· SHALL be capable of performing self-checks (including 
checking whether it is still available, the proper software is installed) and reporting about the 
results. 
O/P_17 [all] The ·voting server· SHOULD regularly perform automatic self-checks and report 
about the results. 
O/P_18 [un] The ·e-voting system· SHOULD be available during the whole ·polling period·.  
O/P_19 [fr] The ·voting client· SHALL ensure that the ·voter’s· ·selections· are accurately 
represented in the ·e-vote·. 
O/P_20 [fr] The ·voting client· SHALL ensure equality and accuracy of presentation of ·ballot· 
options on any ·voter’s client·. 
O/P_21 [fr] The ·voting clients· SHOULD be compatible with any ·voter’s client·. 
O/P_22 [di] The ·counting procedure· SHALL accurately calculate results using the appropriate 
algorithm based on all (authorized) ·e-votes· stored in the ·eballot box· and only such ·e-votes·. 
O/P_23 [un] The ·voting server· SHALL be capable of recording an adequate number of ·votes·. 
O/P_24 [fr] The ·voting device· SHALL support an adequate number of voting options. 
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6. Related Work 
The requirements defined in the paper are based on a list of requirements which one of the 
authors presented in [11] for Digital Recording Machines. This list is based on [7], [4], and 
[2], while it leaves Online-Voting specific requirements from [7] and [4] out. 
The Council of Europe set up a working group in early 2003 to develop a set of standards for 
e-enabled voting that reflect member states’ differing circumstances. 
The standard was published in 2004 [4] and distinguishes between legal standards (covering 
the five election principles), procedural safeguards, operational standards, and technical 
requirements. It states the need for certification without giving any details about how such 
certification could be done.  
The set of requirements for ”Online-Voting Systems for Non-parliamentary Elections” [7] 
(for networked polling-station elections) has been developed by the Physikalisch-Technische 
Bundesanstalt. It contains technical and organisational requirements and is based on an 
analysis of other available requirement catalogues. 
The requirements are classified according to the different time intervals or classified as 
”cross-sectional functions”. The catalogue does not describe the evaluation process or the 
evaluation depth. 
Other relevant lists of requirements are the [6], [5], [3], [13], and [12]. 
7. Future Work 
For one subset of security requirements we proposed to analyse the system in order to 
determine the maximum number of entities which need to be corrupted to violate one of the 
defined requirements. In future, the advantages and disadvantages of small and large k’s are 
going to discussed to point out the consequences, eg, generally, a (k +1)-resilient system is 
better than a k-resilient system. However, k-resilience (w.r.t. a security property) is not an 
absolute measure. This would also help the ·e-voting system· to decide whether it fits with 
their situation. Moreover, the entity itself is going to be split in different sup entities, like the 
software provider, the person responsible for configuration and hosting the ·voting server· as 
well as the administrators. 
Another open task is the definition of requirements where at the moment, only assumptions 
are made (see section 2). The next step is then the application of the above set of requirements 
using the described evaluation techniques to systems in use. 
8. Conclusion 
The list of security objectives in section 5 covers the requirements from the other available 
sets of requirements. There for even if we cannot guarantee to provide a complete list, we at 
least ensured to cover all requirements we found in the literature. Similarly, we only extend 
the to be applied evaluation techniques: In section 4 we explained that the core application of 
the Common Criteria, should be extended by the computation of (k1 + ... + km out of n1 + ... + 
nm)
i
-resilient values for particular requirements in order to take different intruder models and 
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intruder capabilities into account and therefore to make the evaluation results more precisely, 
understandable and thereby more transparent.  
It is worth to mention that we need to add at least the following three requirements: 
 Usab The ·voting client· SHALL be easy to be installed and use on the ·voter’s client·. 
 Organ The ·responsible election authority· SHALL explain why the evaluation results 
meet the trust model of the ·election· environment the ·e-voting system· is used in. 
 Assur The ·testing authority· SHALL evaluate the crypto-protocol in use. 
although we did not consider usability, organisational and assurance requirements in the first 
place. 
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